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BOOK REVIEWS

The Moral Gap by John Hare. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Pp. x,292.
EILEEN SWEENEY, Boston College
The "moral gap" refers to the distance between the moral demand on us
and our abilities to fulfill its commands. Without some way of filling the
gap, we will necessarily fail in our pursuit of morality, and the obligation
and motivation to morality will distintegrate. The gap is filled by God's
assistance. That is the structure of the overall argument of John Hare's
book, which has in effect two theses. First, he puts forward an interpretation of Kant which functions as a correction to the standard interpretations
of Kant which regularly ignore the Christian content of his writings. This
interpretation places the problem of the moral gap (and the attempt to
solve it) at the center of Kant's ethics. Second, there is, he claims at the outset, something to be learned from what he calls "traditional Christianity"
by those interested in ethics in general who reject or prescind from
Christian or theistic belief. This something is the fact that being moral
requires belief in "extra-human assistance." Hare attempts to establish this
conclusion by arguing for the inadequacy of attempts to get around the
problem by "puffing up the capacity" of humans to fulfill the moral
demand, by reducing the demand of morality to the point where we are
capable of fulfilling it, or, lastly, by constructing some substitute for God's
assistal1.ce to bridge the gap. Hare also argues that Kant's solution, found
in his translation of the doctrines of Christianity into the religion of pure
reason, is inadequate. Hare's own solution is that found in the Christian
doctrines of atonement, justification, and sanctification.

a. Kant and the "moral gap"
Our inability to live the moral life as Kant understands it is at least
nominally admitted by most readers of Kant. Once admitted, however, it
is then shrugged off as irrelevant to what ethicists take to be their main
task, to determine what duty requires. At most philosophers tend to admit
that according to Kant it is difficult to know whether we have acted from
rather than merely according to duty. But it is clear from Hare's exposition
of Kant's Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone that the difficulty is not
only a matter of knowledge or even that some of our decisions might be
motivated by inclination rather than duty. We come to moral decisions as
depraved rather than as merely neutral or incompletely good; in Kant's
language, "the ultimate subjective ground of all maxims is postulated as
corrupt."! Like Kierkegaard, Hare argues that not just in Kant but per se the
issue of whether and how we can be moral belongs at the center of ethical
discourse.
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There are a number of objections that can be made to the problem of the
moral gap that divine assistance solves. First, if Kant is wrong about our
moral abilities, there is in fact no moral gap to be filled. This sort of objection is relegated to the second section of the book which is devoted to theories which "puff up the capacity." All the views considered by Hare are
post-Kantian in origin and respond, Hare gives the impression, to problems
created by Kant. If Hare's point were the historical one, that all ethical
thinkers in the West after Kant had to respond to his construction of morality, I would agree that such a case could be made, but Hare seems to want to
make broader claims. First, he wants to show that the moral gap in the
extreme terms described by Protestant Christianity (what Hare calls "traditional Christianity") is the true picture and second, that it is "traditional
Christianity" which has revealed this gap between 'ought' and 'can'. Hare
writes, "If we had not had the history of traditional Christianity behind us,
it would have been more natural to propose a theory in which full-fledged
morality was what humans are capable of by their own devices .... "2 He
admits in a footnote that this structure "is not unique to Christianity" and
cites Aristotle's comments at the end of the Nicomachean Ethics about the
best life which would be more than human, an aspiration we ought, however, not to abandon in favor of the merely human and merely mortaP Most
moral theories, I think, refer to some sort of "moral gap," and the differences between them have to do with how that gap is described and the
strategies devised for living with it or closing it. Thus it may not be that
Christianity displays first and best the moral predicament (as Hare seems to
think, despite the footnote) but that Christianity reiterates in its own terms
the already established nature of human moral aspirations.
Moreover, one way of dealing with the moral gap not considered by
Hare is simply to let it be. For example, for Aristotle, one could argue, the
gap is not nearly so large as that described by Hare (who, again, despite his
disclaimer, paints a distinctly Protestant picture of human propensity
toward evil). Further, human beings are asked to tolerate the gap that
there is while making a greater effort toward virtue, always recognizing
insuperable human imperfection, an imperfection Aristotle was not moved
to eradicate either from the human or divine side of the gap. Aristotle still
finds that we can be moral and happy in human terms, a human happiness
which may, paradoxically, require that our reach always and finally
exceeds our grasp. Plato too, one might argue, portrays human beings as
failing to live up to the fully good life. Plato is closer to Kant in plotting a
larger gap than Aristotle and in arguing that attempting to live the moral
life requires belief in a last judgement cementing the relationship between
virtue and happiness. The Gorgias and Republic close with myths describing the meting out of complete justice for the good and the evil, not
because being moral requires a reward beyond its effects in this life, but
because it requires belief in the order and rationality of the cosmos.
Nonetheless, Plato leaves us with the tension between the reality of human
failure and the clear and undeniable superiority of the virtuous life. In
these two examples, we see that Christianity is not the originator of the gap
and that there are other responses than those found in Luther, Calvin, and
Kierkegaard. While I am myself sympathetic to the view that the moral

262

Faith and Philosophy

gap is somewhat wider than that described by Aristotle, and is one which
requires a response other than the counsel to keep trying to meet one's ethical ideals, Hare's somewhat parochial way of delineating that gap and
closing it makes his case less convincing than it might otherwise be. The
case for the moral gap and divine assistance in closing it would have better
served by a more inclusive account of the moral gap, one which did not
rely solely on Kant's account of it.
Hare's exposition of Kant's construction of and attempts to close the
moral gap is the most convincing part of the book. Hare sees Kant as raising the issue of divine assistance on two fronts. For Kant being moral
requires two kinds of faith in God: first, that which most literally fills the
moral gap described by Hare, the belief that "'Heaven will find the means
to make up our deficiency'." The second is the belief that one's future happiness is not inconsistent with the attempt to live the morallife. 4 Hare contends that the second kind of faith requires the first "because morality
requires its followers not only to pursue both duty and happiness, but to
give duty priority over their other commitments. The first kind of moral
faith allows her to believe that she can give morality this kind of priority
[i.e., duty over happinessl, and that this revolution of the will has actually
been accomplished in her."s
The moral gap gives rise in Kant to the antinomy that it is both necessary and impossible for God to intervene on our behalf.6 This is because of
what Hare calls a "troublesome triad" of beliefs Kant holds: "first, God is
just, and not indulgent; second, we humans have all lived under the evil
maxim; third, God gives us a share in the highest good which is justly
given only as a reward for holiness in an entire life."7 That holiness can
only be achieved by a "revolution" of the will in which we do not become
merely better but "other" or "new" men and women. How, then, can we
reform and deserve happiness, according to Kant? Kant argues, Hare
explains, that there is a kind of atonement whereby the new man suffers
for the old, repaying the debt and justifying the new man. This is the
translation of the doctrine of the incarnation back into the religion of pure
reason, but for Kant its translation into the religion of pure reason cannot
involve the suffering of someone else for us; payment for evil is not transferable as other debts are. Hence, the same person who committed the evil
must suffer, and that means that not even the new man post-conversion
can suffer for the old because morally he is no longer the same person.
Kant writes, " since the infliction of punishment can ... take place neither
before nor after the change of heart, and is yet necessary, we must think of
it as carried out during the change of heart itself."" The suffering is the
pain the new man has living the life of virtue, in Hare's words, "partly
because of the remaining pull of the old way of life and partly because of
the residue of unfinished business from past failure."9 What Kant leaves
unexplained is what brings about that change of heart. It cannot be
prompted by grace, Hare argues, since Kant holds to the so-called "Stoic
maxim," "that a person herself must make or have made herself into whatever, in a moral sense, whether good or evil, she is to become."lo "Calling
to assistance of works of grace," Kant writes, "cannot be adopted into the
maxims of reason, if she is to remain within her limits."l1 Kant ultimately
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concedes that the transformation from evil to good is as incomprehensible
as the Fall from good to evilY My own view is that Kant is right and right
to say that this is the point at which philosophy reaches its limit. Thus I
would not construe the outcome as a failure on Kant's part, as Hare does,
any more than the other antonomies represent a failure to solve a problem.
The second kind of moral faith, believing that pursuit of duty will result
in happiness, leads Kant to "practical proof" for God's existence. Hare supports Kant's view up to a certain point, arguing that living the moral life
requires the belief in moral order, though not necessarily a moral ordererY
Here Hare attempts to offer independent support to the need for belief in
moral order in a peculiar way: he makes a quasi-empirical argument that
those who have managed to continue to strive to live a moral life even in
extreme conditions, for example, victims of the Holocaust, have had this
kind of moral faith.14 Hare argues that Kant himself is unclear whether this
faith can be supported transcendentally or empirically, but his case is based
on Kant's use of Spinoza as an example of the attempt to live the moral life
without the belief in God; the discontinuity between what the good deserve
and what they get, Kant implies, undermines the ability to continue to live
the morallifeY I do not think Kant offers this as empirical evidence of the
necessity of such faith, but as an example illustrating the problem of living
the moral life without it. The belief in moral order is a response to an antinomy, that it is both necessary and impossible to know whether the good
will be rewarded with happiness, and as Hare himself points out, it is
inconsistent with Kantian method to solve an antinomy empirically.
Moreover, there is something problematic about the argument that
those who believe in God and in moral order are more successful at maintaining their moral standards. Greek tragedy contains an important and
edifying truth, as do the cases of those who in anguish were driven to
question their deepest beliefs in the goodness of the universe by tremendous and undeserved suffering. To be immune to that kind of doubt is to
be lacking in a certain kind of humanity. I guess that only means that
those who are gifted with such faith must know it as faith, not as empirically verifiable or probable or even beneficial to their moral health. The evidence for the contrary view is strong indeed. Though Hare does not
explicitly claim anything different, even the attempt to support the existence of moral faith empirically seems to move in such a direction.

b. "Puffing up the capacity" and "reducing the demand"
The first theory that Hare considers under those exaggerating human
ability to act morally is utilitarianism. He focuses not on utilitarianism's way
of determining the moral demand, producing the greatest happiness for the
greatest number, but on the difficulty of actually fulfilling this demand, i.e.,
that in the moral calculus of the greatest happiness, I cannot count my interests more than those of others. This way of considering utilitarianism makes
it conflict directly with Kant's account of our moral defect, that of preferring
our own happiness over duty; Hare, of course, agrees (as he thinks Kant
does) that moral judgements must be impartial but argues that we cannot
reach impartiality without divine assistance. Hare considers Shelly Kagan's
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attempt to defend utilitarianism from the objection that it requires an
unachievable impartiality.16 Kagan argues that we can come to consider others' happiness as much as our own in the same way we can come to consider
our long term interests as much as our short term pleasure: by making the
more distant sets of interests as vivid as the more immediate ones. Hare
argues, convincingly I think, that this process of becoming more vividly
aware of my effect on others will not produce impartiality. First, Hare contends that I might have a very vivid sense of how my actions will affect others, but that this alone does not guarantee that I will consider another's displeasure as equal to my own, if, for example, I am negatively or even indifferently disposed toward that person. Second, while developing such vivid
understanding might make others' suffering weigh more in my more calculus, there is no reason to think it would become as important to me as my
own. For Hare, moving toward such a goal asymptotically is inconsistent
with utilitarianism, which requires total impartiality, and untenable in general. In order to make the moral life our goal, we have to be able to reach
that goal, not simply try, try, try to reach it.
Hare goes on to consider a series of other views grounding morality in at
least some of our desires. He makes some good points along the way. For
example, he argues the naturalist's list of the desires which are natural and,
hence, should be furthered, is incomplete. That list of natural desires, "to
live autonomously, to have deep personal relations, to accomplish something with their lives, to enjoy themselves,"]7 Hare argues, is too parochial,
leaving out intellectual, communal and religious values; it is, in short, the list
"of an individualist, achievement-directed, secular Westemer."18 Second,
Hare contends, the list is "too benign," leaving out the all-too-active desires
for power and prestige. 19 These objections to the list, I take it, are meant to
show that there are inconsistencies between our desires, including downright evil desires, and our moral duty to self and others, disqualifying 'natural' desire as a possible guide to morality. Of course, the naturalist might
argue, as Plato and Aristotle do, that the desire for power over others and
that the desire for prestige are not primitive desires but mistaken or incomplete replacements for the natural desire for virtuous fulfillment.
This entire section on utlitarianism and naturalism is ultimately about
original sin. Hare along with Kant sees human beings as tainted, inclining
toward evil, while, at least on Hare's description, utilitarians and naturalists
do not. I think Hare should simply be more overt about the real source of
the debate. Further, it is not clear what could constitute a proof or even partial evidence of one conclusion over the other. It comes down to what seems
more inexplicable in each accounts. Is human evil adequately explained by
the naturalists? Is human goodness adequately explained by the Calvinist?
Hare, like Pascal, thinks Christianity explains both. Pascal states the case
directly and succinctly: "Is it not as clear as day that man's condition is dual?
The point is that if man had never been corrupted, he would, in his innocence, confidently enjoy both truth and felicity, and, if man had never been
anything but corrupt, he would have no idea of either truth or bliss."20
The section on reducing the demand of morality focuses on theories which
argue that impartiality and universalizability are not required in moral judgements. Hare places feminist critiques of universality and impartiality, like
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those of Nell Noddings and Carol Gilligan, in this category. Like the critique
of utilitarianism in the earlier section, this way of considering Gilligan,
Noddings, et. aI., seems slightly off-center. Though Hare cites Noddings
arguing that we are "not obliged to care for the starving children in Africa,"
because this would require "abandon[ing] the caring" to which we are obligated, it seems that the main point of Noddings and Gilligan's arguments is
not to pare down our ethical obligations but rather to redescribe ethical obligation and ethical action as other than the following of universalizable rules.
In fact, a major point of Gilligan'S argument about girls' moral development,
that they do not approach ethical problems with general rules, is to show that
they are not less moral than boys, who do tend to apply rules, but to argue
that they are equally but differently morally developed. I certainly agree with
Hare's argument there is an important place for justice as well as caring in
our close relationships, and that we have obligations beyond those to our intimates, but I think the difference between the Kantian and "particularist"
views has more to do with whether the fundamental form of moral obligation
is through reason in Kant's sense or through the affect, caring, sympathy or
whatever we might call it, not whether the bar of moral duty is higher or
lower for universalists or particularists.
Hare himself makes a very good point which goes a long way toward
bridging the division between particularists and universalists by describing a model for acting out the obligations we have to strangers, to all
humans. He argues that we may best work to meet this obligation by
"being part of a community which is meeting the needs of strangers," joining our resources and increasing our motivation to serve those beyond our
ken. 21 Belonging to a community might be a strategy to bridge not just the
gap between universalist and particularist moral theories but the moral
gap of Hare's title. The virtue theories of Aristotle, Aquinas, and, in contemporary ethics, MacIntyre and perhaps even Taylor, certainly rely on
(and in the contemporary cases represent attempts to revive) the community as a force strengthening our moral capacities and goals.

c. "substitutes for God's assistance"
The last theories Hare turns to are those that admit the moral gap and
attempt to fill that gap "with some machinery external to the agent's will,
as it were an invisible hand, which transforms egotists into useful members of society."22 For Donald Campbell, social evolution has produced traditional religion with its altruistic ethics as a way of counterbalancing the
biological tendency toward egoism; the two together result in or at least
tend toward a balance that is optimal for the continuation and progress of
society.23 Hare also considers Allan Gibbard's notion of ethics as a version
of an evolutionary theory, as well as Gauthier's updated version of a contract theory. Hare charges all three with a kind of dishonesty about the
nature of morality. For all three theories, morality has value only instrumentally, but even they admit that in order for morality to work, it must be
valued for its own sake. The belief in God to support morality is argued to
be false but useful, and the theories themselves in effect rely on theological
notions robbed of theological content.
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Though he does not quite say so, Hare is criticizing these views from the
Kantian perspective. Kant argues that we have two intuitions about morality which capture its essence; first, that it is an objective and universal
obligation and, second, that its obligations are categorical and not hypothetical. These theories all take morality to be only instrumentally valuable
and have no convincing arguments to explain why, in Gauthier's language,
it wouldn't be most rational to be a "free rider" rather than a full paying
member on the moral system.

d. Hare's conclusion
The final section of the book attempts to explain and support what Hare
takes to be the Christian solution to the moral gap. Hare approaches his
own account from two directions, first, by explaining Kierkegaard's notion
of repentence and the transition from the ethical to the religious life, second, by offering a description of human forgiveness. These expositions
prepare the way for Hare's theory of atonement by which Christ takes on
and atones for human moral failure, thus filling the ethical gap. Hare's
main contribution here is to attempt to answer Kant's objection to admitting to the religion of pure reason the notion of transmissible liability, i.e.,
that someone else can pay for our sins the way someone might pay our
financial debts. He does so by offering a series of analogies in which identities do merge to some degree allowing one member of the relationship to
substitute for the other. He draws on the connections between mother and
child, between friends, and even between individuals and their country. In
all these examples, Hare contends, "the normal evaluative boundaries of
the self" are expanded "beyond a person's skin."24 So, analogously, we can
understand our "incorporation" into Christ and his taking over and
redeeming our failures. The analogies are apt and show that the idea of
Christ's atoning for human sin is not completely unintelligible. Thus, these
analogies make the Pauline theology of the Incarnation coherent, but certainly don't constitute evidence making the Incarnation more likely or anything like the only possible solution for our moral predicament.
Hare closes by contrasting the way in which he and Kant consider the
believer's claims to know and experience God. For Kant, of course, any
one claiming to "feel special works of grace" or "intercourse with God"
is a fanatic, speaking of things he cannot know or feel,25 For Kant, Hare
contends, this makes a certain sense given his narrow sense of what we
can claim to know, "only what we could in principle experience with the
senses," but he implies that he shares no such narrow notion of knowledge. "It will not follow," he writes, "that the Christian cannot responsibily claim to have experience of God or to be united with Christ."26 The
question which Hare does not consider is what the status of such claims
are and how he expects them to be treated by others. While I agree with
Hare that such claims do not fall utterly outside the boundaries of
"meaningful assertion," they are surely different than other sorts of
claims. Like claims of faith in the moral order, they need to be made as
expressions of faith, not knowledge, or even justified or partly justified
true belief. This is perhaps all Kant meant by limiting the claims of rea-
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son in order to make room for faith.
While I cannot agree with Hare's attempt to displace the line between
faith and knowledge, he makes an impressive case for returning this issue, as
well as the problem of the moral gap, and the question of the Christian roots
of Kant's ethics to prominence in philosophical and theological discourse.
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Analytic Theism, Hartshorne, and the Concept of God by Daniel A.
Dombrowski. State University of New York Press, 1996. Pp. xi, 247.
SEAMUS MURPHY, Milltown Institute of Theology and Philosophy
Process philosophy's approach to issues concerning the existence and
nature of God has not gained much acceptance from analytic theist philosophers. Daniel Dombrowski's book should go a considerable way towards
generating more interest among analytic philosophers and, hopefully, recti-

